In the emerging field of climate adaptation, deliberative governance initiatives are proposed to yield better adaptation strategies. However, introducing these network-centred deliberations between public and private players may contrast with traditions of interest intermediation between state and society. This paper shows how state traditions affect newly set up deliberative governance initiatives.
INTRODUCTION
The plurality of problem definitions or frames employed in the societal discussion about adaptation to climate change sparked proposals for more deliberative initiatives of climate adaptation governance. These horizontal forms of network centred policy formulation are claimed to do justice to this plurality in societal frames through deliberations between public and private players compared to traditional institutionalised state centred decision-making (Hulme ; Rojas These 'state traditions' vary in their institutionalised patterns of mutual dependencies between society, organised interest groups and the state, and therefore yield different institutional arrangements, or 'policy regimes' of norms and interaction patterns ( as to what causes differences in deliberative governance initiatives, or aim to add to the well-established body of literature on state tradition or policy styles, we do take this literature as an intriguing background to understand processes of deliberative governance initiatives in the emerging field of climate adaptation, and what might explain cross-state differences. Therefore, this paper takes a qualitative approach to gain an in-depth understanding of how new deliberative governance initiatives are set up and how these function in different state traditions. The paper compares deliberative governance initiatives in terms of (1) institutional arrangements, (2) players involved, and (3) deliberative processes. To understand differences between deliberative governance and traditional policy making, the paper compares deliberative governance with existing policy regimes dealing with climate adaptation challenges in the same state tradition. We focused on water management in the UK and the Netherlands. Firstly, water management represents a typical policy field in which climate impacts are expected to materialize and within which new deliberative governance initiatives proliferate.
Secondly, both countries share geographical characteristics of lowland coastal areas prone to sea level rise and changing precipitation patterns, yet have different traditions in state organisation and water management policy regimes (Wilson ; Cook ; Kuks ) .
The paper poses two questions: (1) How do framing processes and player involvement of a deliberative climate adaptation governance initiative in the Dutch neo-corporatist state tradition compare to framing processes and player involvement of deliberative climate adaptation governance initiatives in the British pluralist state tradition?
(2) How do framing processes and player involvement in deliberative governance initiatives of climate adaptation compare to the framing processes and player involvement in traditional water management policy regimes taking care of climate adaptation in Dutch neo-corporatism? For answering these questions the next section of this paper will elaborate on the conceptual foundations of state traditions and policy regimes, which we contrast with scholarly ideas on deliberative governance. We propose framing theory as cross-cutting for understanding how deliberative processes actually play out in different institutional contexts. After that we describe our methodological approach, case study selection and how we conducted field research. In our results section we contextualise our conceptual framework for climate adaptation in the Dutch and British, context after which we zoom in on three concrete climate adaptation governance case studies and draw conclusions on how both state traditions affect the deliberative governance processes under study.
STATE TRADITIONS, POLICY REGIMES AND DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES; CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

Institutionalised interest intermediation
Where in continental European history the state gained a central role as an idea and an institution safeguarding the nations' public interest, in the Anglo-Saxon world such as the UK the state remained relatively underdeveloped in taking care of this national public interest. Contrary to continental European tradition, where on a philosophical level some authors claim the state to be an administrative institution which is positioned 'in-between' the politically elected government and the governed, policymaking in the UK can be understood as the direct execution of parliamentary will. In theory this means that despite heated opposition a (regional) majority interest can win without interference of 'a state' as an institution representing the nations' 'collective'
interest (Dyson  
Deliberative governance initiatives
Apart from prolonged institutionalized patterns in interest intermediation discussed as state traditions and policy regimes, scholars in policy sciences have highlighted an empirical trend towards less institutionalized practices of interest intermediation and policy making. Although conceptually still imprecise, these forms of governance can be characterized processes of deliberations through interorganizational networks which come with a withdrawing state government (Kickert et al. ; Rhodes ; Sabatier ) . Contrary to the institutionalized negotiations that characterize state traditions like corporatism, this form of governance may be conceptualized as institutionally 'decentred', or network centred, in the sense that the institutional capacity to regulate the process of governing remains under developed: Policy outcomes are less dependent on a sovereign regulating authority responsible for decision making, but more on a marked like co-production of equal players negotiating trough language (Bevir & Rhodes ; Howlett ) . This empirical notion of a decentred or network approach to policy making correlates with the definition of deliberative governance often prescriptively adopted in climate adaptation studies as discussed in our introduction section. Because these prescribed deliberations go beyond empirically observed genuine trends towards more 'decentred' governance, we choose to focus on intentionally initiated governance deliberations between public and private players. We defined these initiatives in line with Dryzek () as deliberative governance initiatives that are increasingly employed by governments to involve society in policy making in different ways than through democratic elections or institutionalized forms of interest intermediation. These initiatives often get shape as temporal policy programmes discussed above, but may also concern more structural decentralizations of policy execution toward a wide variety of regional or local public and private players. In all cases deliberations take place in-between institutions rather than within. However, not all state traditions or policy regimes seem to allow for ad hoc deliberative governance initiatives. Where pluralist traditions show similarities with deliberative governance considering a wide variety of societal players traditionally involved and a relatively moderate role for the central state, corporatist traditions show a stronger role of the state, a high degree of institutionalization, hierarchy and a limited amount of preselected societal players involved.
Mainstreaming or ad hoc deliberation: operationalizing the climate adaptation policy process is at stake, but may at the same time help organizing power by defining the issue at stake and posing a moral standpoint towards the issue at stake in relation to the other players and frames involved in the policy process.
METHODOLOGY
Methodological approach
We applied a qualitative constructivist approach in doing comparative case study research. We did so for gaining in-depth understanding how processes of deliberative governance initiatives play out in different state traditions, and how these processes compare to climate adaptation mainstreamed in existing policy regimes. Although we are aware of the limitations of case study research in drawing general conclusions on cause-effects in policy research, we follow Flyvbjerg (), Gerring () and Thomas () in their assessment of comparative case study research as a method for gaining understanding of the non-linear indepth relations between a wide variety of variables in context. We apply case study research to nuance general theory and intuitions on deliberative governance initiatives in the emerging field of climate adaptation. To do so we conduct two separate comparisons: (1) similar deliberative governance initiatives in the emerging field of climate adaptation are compared on the basis of different state traditions in which they are embedded, and (2) a deliberative governance initiative in the field of climate adaptation is compared to an existing policy regime that mainstreams climate adaptation in the same state tradition.
Because the neo-corporatist state tradition is theoretically most distinct from the open character of deliberative governance, we took a Dutch deliberative governance initiative of climate adaptation in regional water management as our point of departure. For the selection of our second comparable deliberative governance case in a different state tradition we chose a British regional initiative in relation to water management for its comparable geographical characteristics and its state tradition being different from the Dutch tradition and more closely related to the limited role of the state as represented in deliberative governance (Dryzek ) . For our second comparison we once more took the Dutch deliberative governance initiative as our point of departure which we this time compared with climate adaptation taken care of in the existing regional Dutch water policy regime. With this second comparison we were able to understand the empirical difference between what we theoretically defined as a deliberative governance initiative and policy making in a traditional policy regime which mainstreams climate adaptation in existing policies.
Case selection
For the first comparison we selected two cases which represent different state traditions but share novel deliberative governance initiatives on water management adaptation to climate. In the case of (neo-)corporatist Netherlands we selected the governmental initiated multilevel deliberative governance initiative of the Dutch Delta Programme for the Ijsselmeer region (DPIJ). We selected this programme because it represents a rather innovative and unique, For pluralist UK we selected the deliberative governance initiative embedded in the Regional Flood and Coastal Committees (RFCCs) of Anglia in the UK. We selected this initiative because it represents a novel deliberative governance approach to climate adaptation in water management compared to earlier national agency centred policy making in the same field. Contrary to the unique deliberative governance initiative in the Dutch climate adaptation context, our British case represents a much wider applied initiative.
Throughout most of the low laying parts of the UK the RFCCs are characterised by regional and local public and For our second comparison we selected the unique deliberative governance initiative in the Netherlands discussed above, which we compared with a traditional water management policy regime in the Netherlands dealing with climate adaptation and referred to as 'Dry feet 2050'.
We selected Dry feet 2050 because it can be classified as an archetypal Dutch regional governmental centred programme on flood safety issues which mainstreams the potential impacts of climate change in their flood safety policies (Boezeman et al. ) . The programme is characterised by institutionalised decision-making. In line with the (neo-)corporatist state tradition the provincial authority takes the lead in this regional programme and water board authorities follow together with a couple of traditionally determined preselected organisations representing vested interests. Deliberations take place through hierarchical institutionalised decision-making patterns and informal routines.
Data collection and analysis
We collected data during the policy trajectories under study.
For the Dutch cases we conducted research between 2010 and 2013, which overlaps with the programme duration of DPIJ (2010 DPIJ ( -2014 and Dry feet 2050 (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . For the British case interviews were conducted and document analysis was done during the same period. Our data consisted of three parts. We used project documents and textual information on the institutional arrangements of the projects. We additionally used textual recordings or notes of project meetings, stakeholder meetings and steering committee meetings. This was complemented by interviews with project officials and key stakeholders.
To determine how concrete policy processes played out in (neo-)corporatist compared to pluralist state traditions, or deliberative governance initiatives compared to existing policy regimes we describe: (1) In the UK the emergence of climate adaptation on the policy agenda resulted in the formulation of a national climate act, which at a national level went beyond specific policy fields. Contrary to the Dutch context, the act enhanced a rather managerial approach to climate adaptation as a crosscutting regional issue. By formally decentralizing climate adaptation responsibilities, regional public and private organizations were assigned to make policies at their administrative scale. National government only coordinated their regional activities in various policy fields Land Drainage Act. The act involved the establishment of regional Catchment Boards to provide flood defences and drainage in certain areas (Cook , ) . The creation of Regional Water Authorities in 1974 led to flood control tasks becoming shared between these regional entities, local authorities and internal drainage boards (IBDs) (Benson et al. a, b) . Although pluralist in terms of the variety of (societal) organisations involved, deliberation in decision-making became restricted to rather technocratic regional authorities and IDBs, whose umbrella group, the Association of Drainage Authorities, was seen as dominated by land-owner vested interests (Purseglove & Britain ). 
Institutional arrangement
The Delta programme is coordinated by a special state official ('Delta Commissioner') who acts under the responsibility of the Minister of Public Works and is legitimized by new national legislation; a Delta Act (Delta Programma ). The Delta Commissioner is to prepare so-called Delta Decisions to be made by government every five years (Delta Programma ). One Delta Decision, planned for 2015, is whether to raise the water level in the country's largest freshwater lake 'Ijsselmeer' by 1.5 meter.
The initial plan of raising the lake's water level was put on the policy agenda by the Delta Committee aiming for an enlarged freshwater reservoir anticipating increased future summer droughts and to a lesser extend increased flood safety in view of decreasing discharge capacity to the raising sea level of the adjacent Waddensea. Accordingly, the Delta Programme contains a sub-programme for the Ijsselmeer region (DPIJ), which has been established to prepare the Delta Decision parallel to constitutional decision-making structures. The decision could heavily impact on several waterfront towns with low-lying traditional quays and harbours attracting many tourists. However, some nature reserves also face permanent inundation in case the intended 1.5 m rise in water level will be sustained, and some low-lying industrial areas face flooding (Delta Programma Ijsselmeergebied ).
Anticipating the potential impacts on the region, regional governments adjacent to the lake organized themselves in an 'Ijsselmeer'-group opposing the initial plans.
After the establishment of DPIJ this Ijsselmeer group was incorporated in a broad deliberative governance network of about 300 public and private players initiated by an administrative office established for DPIJ. The administrative office was made accountable to a steering committee consisting of four appointed representatives from all regional politically elected decision-makers. The DPIJ deliberations were presented as a bottom-up governance process (Delta Programma ). As the deputy director of the DPIJ explained to over 100 public and private players in one of the first network meetings, 'climate is changing, the Ijsselmeer water system is running into its limits, and we want to cooperate with you in finding ways to adapt the water system'.
Player involvement
During the first phases of the programme the stakeholder meetings were set up by the DPIJ administrative office as knowledge-sharing meetings. Over 300 public and private players from the Ijsselmeer region were invited to get to know each other and to share knowledge about their insights in the lake's water system. Players concerned regional administrators, experts, regional politically elected 
Processes of framing
After the Delta Committee put the Ijsselmeer region on the policy agenda as a national security issue, the national civil servants and experts from the DPIJ administrative office reframed the security issue into an 'upgrading the water system' frame, for which in view of a changing climate, 'doing nothing was not an option'. By setting the boundaries of the deliberations in form of a technical 'upgrade' of a national scaled interest, the administrative office defined the players who were the plausible holders of relevant pieces of the puzzle: the mostly national and regional public administrators directly involved in the technical or procedural characteristics of the system. In addition, by framing the issue as a national 'system' wittingly or unwittingly, the administrative office put technical experts in charge leaving less room for political elected decisionmakers lacking the technical knowledge to join in solving a 'technical puzzle'. Regional political elected decisionmakers struggled with reframing the technically defined 'system' issue into a regional scaled societal or political issue. Repeatedly public and private regional players asked the DPIJ administrative office to be clear about the water level as preferred by the national government on the medium-long term, or to be clear about the decision- For reasons of geographical similarity with Dutch lowland areas, we will focus only on the Anglian region in eastern England (Table 1) . Covering more than 27,000 km 2 , it is comprised of mainly high quality agricultural land extending across several counties. Although the driest EA region in terms of rainfall, there are particular issues surrounding flooding as most of the land is flat and low-lying, with 25% below sea level (Environment Agency ). The north Norfolk and Suffolk coast is also particularly vulnerable to sea erosion while saline inundation is an ever-present threat to the Broads; a protected area of waterways popular with tourists. To compound these risks, the region is home to six million people and has the fastest expanding population in England and Wales. The region contains three RFCCs: the Northern, Southern, and Eastern. The EA must consult with the RFCC on conducting its flood and coastal management functions, take into account the committee's decisions in performing these functions, obtain the permission of the committee when setting a to ensure coordination between the local and regional levels, and consistency with the national strategy. The EA still maintained overall national responsibility for managing river and coastal flooding risks in view of climate change. A key coordinating mechanism in this respect is the National
Institutional arrangements
Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy
with its focus on adaptation to climate change, and at a regional level the RFCCs.
Player involvement
While meetings are open to the public, RFCC membership and input to decision-making is restricted to local authorities and player groups pre-determined by the EA. 
Processes of framing
Framing of flood management issues by committees is partly determined by national strategic objectives, central government funding and, increasingly, local spending and flood defence priorities. A visible process of reframing occurred after the Pitt Review, with the government perceiving flood governance more in terms of localised stakeholder input to decision-making and partnership working.
Although this reframing did not alter the scale of regional governance structures, as the RFCCs replaced the RFDCs, it did lead to the re-organisation of committees to include greater local authority participation. This 'partnership' frame to both funding and managing flood controls has to an extent altered local authority roles. Regional priorities are set by the National Strategy, published in 2011 but local authorities appear now to have greater influence over targeting of investments for their priority projects.
Analysis suggests that local flooding concerns are being addressed in the committee decision-making. For example, in the Anglian region the EA has had to consult with the committee to a greater degree than in the past on its regional programme and spending, although the partnership approach was already evident before the institutional changes. According to the Agency (Environment Agency ), it has been 'working with stakeholders to build strong working relationships to ensure a co-ordinated approach' in the region. As a result, all five LLFAs in the Anglian Eastern Region were able to complete preliminary flood risk assessments and local flood risk management strategiesthe latter in conjunction with other stakeholders and the public. These documents will underpin future committee decision-making in the region. While the post-Pitt era has therefore witnessed a reframing of the floods issue towards a more 'local' understanding of the problem in regional governance structures, there is still an element of centralised agency control. follow up study of their previous five yearly regional flood safety updates. These HOWA studies focused on so called secondary or regional water barriers which concern smaller inland water systems, which are mainly rain fed. The update study was relabelled as DV2050 (Dutch for Dry Feet 2050).
The policy letters formulated four direct reasons for the relabelled update. First, the HOWA studies did not deal with the long term, especially with respect to climate change and soil subsidence. Second, the Province of Groningen decided in 2005 that it wanted to strive for higher safety norms for regional water barriers to be 1:300 and 1:1,000. Third, the models used in the previous studies advanced and provide water levels that differ from the older models. Fourth, the regional barriers are to be periodically tested. Following the strategic provincial environmental plan for [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] in which climate adaptation was labelled as a central goal, the problem scope of the project was clearly embedded in a climate adaptation narrative.
Institutional arrangement
Besides taking up climate change in the existing regional policy regime, the DV 2050 project differs slightly from previous HOWA studies with respect to its intentions for stakeholder participation. The start-up document states that preselected stakeholders will be involved as early as possible 
Player involvement
The project group of civil servants prepares decisions and operates with sub-projects for which the vested interests in region are invited as a matter of routine. These are the branch organization of farmers LTO, the umbrella organizations for nature and environmental groups, the organization of the municipalities and the committee on soil subsidence and energy related organisations (the area of concern is the largest gas mining area in the Netherlands, involving various large infrastructural works and the issue of soil subsidence due to mining). These organisations are labelled as 'priority stakeholders'. The priority stakeholders receive the agenda of the project group meetings, may raise new agenda issues and are welcomed to comment, which they occasionally do. One sub-project leads the defining safety norms and two deal with developing adaptation policies for the water systems of the two water boards.
Those sub-projects initiate studies by knowledge institutes and consultants for specific expertise or calculations.
The project group coordinates and sets the preconditions for the adaptation policies studies in consultation with the priority stakeholders. From the start onwards, the ambition in DV2050 was to intensify stakeholder interaction in this project vis-à-vis the earlier HOWA studies. The stakeholder kick-off event was well-attended, but the sense of urgency for the problem of the project was low. In part this was due to a lack of concreteness of showing what the consequences of climate change were for the water system or for stakeholders. For another part, the tradition of the state providing safety for its inhabitants in a rather corporatist manner was effective and non-controversial, and accordingly the general goal and organisation of the project was non-disputed (Boezeman et al. ) .
In all phases of the project the technical and participatory trajectories are clearly separated. Contrary to the overall project group organisation where ideas and policy preferences are formulated, the technical trajectory of the sub groups is expert-dominated. In these sub-groups the different packages of policies developed in the project group are considered by assessing their hydrological, economic, environmental, cultural heritage, and agricultural effects, also in view of future climate change. The administrators then propose the technically best assessed policies to their parliaments for decision-making. Here, we observe a classical feature of Dutch (neo-)corporatist policy making, where experts delineate the substantial playing field in which players may bargain (Halffman ).
Processes of framing
As discussed above, officially the DV 2050 project is framed as a periodic update of the water safety system in view of cli- 
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
The results summarised in Table 2 A national strategic objective (climate proofing the Netherlands) reframed as a technical task of updating lake Ijsselmeer
After the Pitt Review national government framed water safety as a regional climate change adaptation issue, to be taken care of regionally, with local stakeholder input for decisionmaking and 'partnership' working Regional flood safety maintenance, reframed as a long term challenge of increasing safety in view of a changing climate
Interaction patterns: Interaction patterns: Interaction patterns:
Various scale and problem frames existed but the state centred national technical framing remained dominant, yielding cross scale learning but ambiguity about actual implementation and apathy among regional decision-makers and stakeholders struggling with how to make sense of the national technical framing in their own interest Although the reframing did not alter the scale of regional governance structures it did lead to deliberative processes in the committees. This 'partnership' frame to both funding and managing flood controls has to an extent altered local authority roles (2) Despite limitations to qualitative case study comparisons these results suggest that state traditions matter in enabling for deliberative governance initiatives. Scholarly pleas for effective climate adaptation through deliberative governance initiatives should be viewed in light of country specific traditions in policy making and interest intermediation.
